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THE VALUE OF LITERARY SOCIETIES IN THE SCHOOL.
While study of the law and a knowledge
of legal principles is fundamental and
necessary in order to follow the profession,
there is another branch which is just as
essential, and the development of which is
just as necessary in order to make a successful lawyer; namely, acquiring the
power of extemporaneous speech. The
work of a lawyer is not all confined to an
office and matters of reference, to private
consultation, and the giving of advice. In
most instances these are but the preliminary factors in a suit, the preparations for
the actual trial which is to follow, and it is
the lawyer who can, upon the spur of the
moment, stand before the jury and make
a weighty extemporaneous address, who
can then and there deliver a strong and
convincing argument, that is most successful in the final outcome of his case. This
power Qf extemporaneous speech does not
come naturally to every one, and it is in
the opportunities for developing this side
of a man's education that literary societies
afford, which gives to them especial value.
There are but few men, who, when unexpectedly called upon can, off hand, deliver
a commendable address, in fact it is almost universal experience that the unfortunate individual who is called upon to deliver his first extemporaneous effort, rises
to his feet, his heart thumping with the

rapidity of the revolutions of the drive
wheels of a steam engine travelling at the
rate of ninety miles per hour, and after
vainly attempting to swallow the lump
which comes into his throat, which wont
be downed, and uselessly endeavoring
to collect his scattered wits and force
them into sensible sentences, blurts out
a few inarticulate, confused and meaningless words and then sinks into his seat,
wondering "where in the world he is
at." To every man who intends following
the profession of the law, this time is
bound to come. It may be. in a political
meeting before a house crowded with constituents, wben failure wjll mean ignominy; it may be before a circle of friends,
when failure to meet their expectations
means disgrace, or it may be before a court
and jury, where inability to meet the exigencies of the occasion means, not only
the loss of the case at bar, and the confidence and respect of your client, but it
also means an injury to your reputation as
a lawyer and a consequent impediment to
future success. The way to avoid these
unfortunate results is for the individual to
have confidence in himself; this confidence
can only be gained through experience,
and the best manner in which to gain this
experience with the least unpleasant results is to pass through it along with those
who are in the same boat with yourself.
This is just what the societies in the law
school afford. Here all men are on an
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oratorical equality. No one person is any
better prepared or equippedthan another.
and it is the man who takes advantage of
the opportunities offered him who will
meet with the most success in the future.
What though you do make mistakes here,
suppose you are embarrassed when you attempt to speak, you are now surrounded
by men who are in the same condition,
and who, perhaps, would not even meet
with your success were they transferred to
your position; pitch in and say something
even if it does mean nothing, and there
will gradually come to you that confidence
and belief in your own ability, which will
relieve you from embarassing failure in
the future and insure you of much greater
measures of success. Tie societies in the
school are good ones, and a strong rivalry
is maintained between then. Their work
is of a high quality, and the practical benefit derived from active work therein is
demonstrated by the greater readiness of
speech displayed in the moot courts by
those who participate in the exercises over
men who take no part in either society.
Every man ought to insist upon being
placed upon the programme as frequently
as possible, and the benefit which will
thereby be gained will be surprising.
It is a matter of regret to every member
of the school, that Dr. Trickett was not
declared successful in his candidacy for the
Superior Court Bench, even though his
election would have meant a practical
severance from active work in the school.
His fitness for the position is unquestioned,
and the strong support given to him by
many voters throughout the State show
that it is recognized. Throughout all his
life, Dr. Trickett has been a hard worker,
and a conscientious student, reading widely and much, and faithfully devoting himself to the pursuit of the law, so that he
would have made an intelligent, learned
and able judge. In addition to this, he is
not a politician, never having been interested nor engaged in any political controversy. One of the questions which is
agitating the various communities of the
State to-day, is, the necessity of keeping
the bench and politics separate. We see
this in every contest for judgeship, and
that it is a wise and proper thing to do, all
men will admit. So that, had Dr. Trick-

ett been successful in his candidacy, we
would hav had this necessary qualification
fulfilled in him, and in addition to having
an able judge, would have had a non-partisan as well. However, what the Bench
may have lost the school has gained, and
it is a matter of great gratification to every
student, to feel and know that he will
continue to experience the benefit and advantage to be derived from the personal
contact with, and instruction of Dr. Trickett.

The law school is taking a very prominent part in athletics this year, and is
demonstrating very satisfactorily what it
can do, when given a fair show. During
previous years, the charge has been made,
whether correctly or not we cannot say,
that the law men were not given equal
representation with the college men in
their athletic aspirations, but this year no
such complaint can be made, for it is very
evident that the athletic officials are doing
all in their power to give to the law men
equal privileges with the college men. We
have on the foot-ball team two very valuable players, Devall, captain of the team,
and Diehl, and on the sub-team, two men,
Hess and Sloan, who, by their superior
playing, bid fair to oust some of the Varsity and take their places. The result of
all this is, that there exists between the
two departments less jealousy and ill feeling and more good will, than there has
ever been manifested before. This is but
proper. The bond of good fellowship
should be strengthened, and none but feelings of the strongest friendship should exist. The interests of the two departments
arb identical, and they can best be advanced and protected only by increasing
this friendly feeling.

THE SCHOOL.
During the past month the Sigma Chi
Fraternity was re-established in Dickinson College, and among those initiated
were, W. S. Rothermel, W. W. Johnston,
and H. S. Winlack, of the Law School.
A Democratic mass meeting was held
in the Court House on the evening of
Nov. 5th, at which Leon Prince, of the
Law School, was one of the speakers. The
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address of Mr. Prince was masterful in
every way; his style is pleasing, and his
logic convincing. There is, without doubt,
a very brilliant future in store for him.
We notice among our list of exchanges,
the following papers: The .Harvardlaw
Review, The Inter-Collegian,and the advance sheet from the "Lawyers Coiperative Publishing Company."
Berntheisel, '98, of Dr. Jekyll and Mr.
Hyde fame, was in town a short time, recently. He is at present in an office in
Columbia, his home, having not yet applied for admission to the bar.
Snyder is in Northumberland county,
in the office of H. W. Savidge.
Reese has returned to the Law School,
and will continue his work with the class.
The Junior class has effected the following organization:
President, Sebring;
Vice-president, Merkel; Secretary, Miss
Marvel, Treasurer, Light.
Up to the present time, Moot Courts
have been held only on Monday and
Tuesday nights of each week, the trials
participated in by the Senior and Middle
men. A new court has been formed,
which will be held on Thursday night, of
each week, with Judge Sadler sitting as
judge. Dr. Trickett is the presidingjudge
in the other court. In the lately formed
court, the Juniors will act as counsel and
try the cases there. This gives to the Dickinson Law School, three Mfoot Courts a
week, and six cases, two cases being tried
each court, and offers facilities along this
line which no other law school in the
country affords.
W. D. Boyer, '92, has been making himself exceedingly popular with the Dickinson "rooters," by liberal pecuniary donations to the Athletic Association, as a reward to the football team, for its glorious
record. After the Lafayette game, Mr.
Boyer presented to the college $50.00, and
after the F. & Al. game $25.00. Keep it
up, Mr. Boyer.
J. H. Reiff, '95, was in town recently,
being interested in a criminal court case.

Mr. Reiff has his office at New Cumberland, and practices in Cumberland, York
and Dauphin county courts. He is meeting with great success.
Messrs. Sypherd and Moyer spent a day
on the battlefield at Gettysburg recently.
At a meeting of the Middle class held
October 20th, the following officers were
elected for the ensuing year: President,
B. Johnston MacEwen ; Vice-president,
Llewellyn Hildreth; Secretary, Julia A.
Radle ; Treasurer, J. Kirk Boslkr.
DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The Society continues to prosper. At
the several meetings held October 8th, 14th
and 21st, thirty-five members enlisted in
her ranks, and a number more are awaiting proposition. In the trial of the moot
court cases argued Friday evening, October
14, S. B. Hare, '98, sat asjudge. Thecounsels for the plaintiff were Messrs. Henderson and Miller; defendant, Messrs. Geary
and Wolf. The plaintiff was ordered to
pay the costs.
No less interesting was the case of the
following meeting argued by recently
elected members of the society, Messrs.
Hubler and Rehm, plaintiff, and O'Keefe
and Reefer, defendant. Thejudges, Messrs.
John and Hildreth, '99, gave judgment for
the plaintiff.
"Should the Lawyer enter Politics?"
was a resolution ably debated by Junior
members of the Law School. Messrs.
Geary and Shellenberger spoke on the affirmative and Collins and Russel on the
negative. The judges decided in favor of
the affirmative.
On October s8th the society was very
fortunate in securing, through the instrumentality of ir. MacEwen, chairman of
the Executive Committee, the services of
Prof. F. C. Woodward, who delivered a
lecture on "Some Things Not Found in
Books."
This -was Prof. Woodward's
first appearance before either of the societies, and the students, realizing that the
lecture would be a rare treat, greeted him
with a large audience. The appreciation
of his remarks was demonstrated by the
outburst of applause given at the close of
his speech, and on motion, a hearty vote of
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thanks in behalf of the society and student
body in general was extended to him.
Never has the society been in a more
prosperous condition, and unless all indications fail, the members will receive lasting benefit from the various meetings to
be held during the coming year.

honorary members the name of Prof. F.
In addition they have
C. Woodward.
received into meinbership the following
new men: Messrs. Long, Kennedy, Bolte,
Coblentz, Vale, Prince, Shambaugh, Alexander, Harpell, Lightner, Houck, Rothermel, Valentine, Taylor, Lentz, Shipman,
and Seigris.

THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
Tie Allison Law Society began the
year's work on Wednesday evening, Oct.
12. a large audience being present. President Charles G. Moyer called the meeting
to order, and introduced George V. Coles
as presiding judge for the evening. The
case was one in assumpsit, and also involved the question of proximate and remote cause. The plaintiff was represented
by Messrs. Weeks and McMeans while
Messrs. Freed and Landis appeared for the
defendant. Mr. Coles reserved his decision
and in a few days handed down a voluninous opinion thoroughly elucidating the
law in issue. After the case the regular
order of business was resumed, and President Moyer in a few well chosen remarks
welcomed the new men to the meetings of
the society.
The next case tried was a unique case of
license, Charles McMeans sitting as Judge,
Messrs. Prince and Sypherd appeared for
the plaintiff, while the interests of the defendant were looked after by Messrs.
Stevens and Long. The delicate questiong
of law which were brought forward in this
case were handled in a very able manner.
On Nov. 11 a case of sale was trieil, D.
Edward Long sitting as judge. The plaintiff was represented by Messrs. Coblentz
and Moyer, the defendant by Messrs.
Kennedy and Meyer. The meeting night
of the society was changed from Wednesday- evening to Friday evening, and we
now meet in Lecture room No. 1. A
pleasing innovation in the trial of cases
has .been made by having Seniors and
Middle men sit as Judges.
It seems as if this year would be one of
the most prosperous years in the history
of the Allison society. At no time has the
quality of work done been better, nor the
interest displayed in its welfare been
greater. This augurs well for the future.
The society has been honored by being
permitted to inscribe among its roll of

THE DELTA CHI FRATERNITY.
The school year 1898-9 has opened very
auspiciously for the Delta Chi Fraternity.
Last year the fraternity occupied a house
at Diffbly's Point, but this has been given
up and the chapter is located in a much
more convenient part of the town. The
suite of rooms forimerly occupied by the
Carlisle Wheel Club has been secured and
after a thorough renovation at the hands
of the decorator and furnisher, the apartments present a most handsome appearance.
As to new material, the fraternity has
been most fortunate in securing some of
the best men of the Junior Class, which is
conceded to be one of the finest classes that
has entered the Law School since its inception.
On Friday evening, November 11th, a
banquet was given after the regular meeting. In addition to the members, Prof.
Frederic C. Woodward and Norman L.
Bonbroke, Esq., a leading member of the
Franklin County Bar, were present as
guests of the Fraternity.
LECTURE OF PROF. WOODWARD.
The address delivered by Professor Frederic C. Woodward before the Dickinson
Society on the evening of October 28th,
was one of peculiar interest to students.
Every lawyer knows that there is a vast
amount of legal wisdom which cannot be
acquired from the law books, and yet
which is absolutely essential to successful
practice. Ordinarily it comes to the young
practitioner through the slow and painful
process commonly known as "experience,"
which too often means profiting by one's
mistakes. As the subject of the address,
"Some Things Not in the Books," implies
the purpose of the speaker was to point
out the mistakes most commonly made by
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the beginner, and to make some suggestions
that might be of value to himat the threshold of his career. Since Professor Woodward was called to the law school from the
New York City Bar, where he has been
engaged in practice for several years, he is
amply qualified to deliver such an address.
In order that his suggestions might be
presented in an orderly fashion, Professor
Woodward took a supposed personal injury action of a simple and familiar type,
and followed its conduct from the time
'when the client first seeks the advice of
counsel to the conclusion of the trial. In
the first place he spoke of the relation between lawyer and client; of the mistrust
with which the young and inexperienced
lawyer is often regarded by his own client;
and of the way in which mistrust can be
changed into confidence, and confidence
preserved, even in the hour of defeat. The
necessity of getting afairand unprejudiced
statement of the facts of the case before
bringing suit, and of prompt action in seeing the witnesses and if possible in securing their sworn statements, was strongly
urged. The successive steps in the action
were then outlined, and the details of
preparation for trial dwelt upon at length.
Especial emphasis was given to the great
value, upon the trial of many cases, of a
carefully prepared trial brief, containing a
copy of the pleadings, memoranda of the
testimony to be given by each witness,
and authorities upon any question of law
that is likely to arise.
In conclusion the speaker made a few
suggestions in regard to the conduct of the
trial, calling attention particularly to the
danger of "over-trying" the cause, and
warning his hearers against the common
error of exercising too freely the right of
These points, like
cross-examination.
many of the preceding ones, were illustrated by actual cases which had come
within the observatidn of the speaker, and
the narration of which added greatly to
the interest of the address.
Harry F. Kantner and Paul H. Price
have successfully taken the examination
to the Berks County Bar. Out of ten applicants, two failed to pass, one being a
graduate of Cornell Law School and the
other a graduate of Kent Law School ot
Chicago. This speaks well for our school.

MOOT COURT.
JOHN COCKROFT vs. JACOB INNES.
Before Auditors.
ELI SAULSBURY

and ISAIAH

SCHEE-

for the plaintiff.
The landlord can claim priority only for
rent due at the time of levy.-Trickett on
Liens, Vol. 3, p. 585; Case v. Davis, 15 Pa.
80; Merrill v. Trimmer, 2 Pa. C.C. 49; Bihns
v. Hudson, 5 Binney 506; West v. Sink, 2
Yeates 274; Morgan v. Moody, 6 W. & S.
335; Moss' Appeal, 35 Pa. 162; Wickey v.
Eyster, 58 Pa. 501; Owens v. Shovlin, 116
Pa. 371; Minnig v. Sterrett, 7 Pa. C. C. 73;
The landlord's priority of lien extends only
for one year's rent.-Act of June 16, 1836,
See. 83; Richie v. McCauley, 4 Pa. 471;
Weltner's Appeal, 63 Pa. 302.
LINE

FRANKC J. LAuBENSTEIN and A. FRANK
JOHN for the defendant.

Under the act of June 16, 1836, John
Cockroft can recover only such amount as
remains of the fund in excess of one year's
rent, said rent being payable to Thomas
Hudson.-Platt v. Johnson, 168 Pa. 47; affirming 15 Pa. C. C. 587; Goodwin v.
Sharkey, 80 Pa. 149.
To the lHon .rable,the Judges of the Court
of Common Pleas:
The undersigned appointed by your Honorable Court, auditors, to distribute the
funds in the hands df the sheriff in the
above case, find the facts to be as follows:
On December 27, 1895, Thomas Hudson
leased a house in Mechanicsburg to Innes
for the period of two years, commencing
on April 1, 1896. The lease required the
rent, $25 per month, to be paid monthly
in advance. It also stated that if the lessee
should die, or if he, becoming insolvent,
should assign for creditors, or if his property on the premises should be levied on in
execution, the rent for the whole term
should become instantly payable. On August 17, 1896, Cockroft issued an execution
on a judgment for $1305, on which a levy
was made on the goods of Innes on the
premises. The sale produced $430 in excess of all costs.
According to the terms of this lease, if
the property of the lessee on the premises
should be levied on in execution, the rent
for the whole term was to become payable
instantly. This contingency occurred by
the issuing of the execution by Cockroft
on August 17,1896, and asaresult the property was sold, and the proceeds, amounting to $430 in excess of all costs, which are
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in the hands ot the sheriff, are claimed by
both Hudson and Cockroft.
If the conditions contained in the lease
are valid, and the rights and interests of
no other person are affected thereby, and
there are no statutory prohibitions, Hudson, the landlord, upon the sheriff's levy
is clearly entitled to the whole sum, but if
the contrary appears, he is not so entitled.
That such conditions may be made, and
that they are'not illegal and contrary to public policy is seen from the doctrine of Platt,
Barber & Co. v. Johnson & Peterson, 168
Pa. 47, where it is held "that stipulations
may be made between a landlord and tenant in their lease whereby, upon the happening of certain contingencies, the rent
for the whole term shall fall due, and that
a landlord is entitled to claim rent payable
in advance out of the proceeds of a sheriff's
sale on the goods of a tenant, provided his
claim does not exceed one year's rent."
Which doctrine is further upheld by Collins' Appeal, 35 Pa. 83, and Purdy's Appeal, 23 Pa. 97. In Goodwin v. Sharkey,
80 Pa. 149, it is held that "the whole rent
for the term might have been made payable in advance, and there exists no reason
why it might not be made payable at any
time during the running of the lease, upon
the happening of the contingency, and if
the rights of creditors have not attached
previously, could collect the rent for the
entire term." By the provisions of the
act of June 16, 1836, "The goods and chattels being in or upon any messuage, lands
and tenements which are or shall be demised for life, or years, or otherwise, taken
by virtue of an execution and liable to the
distress of the landlord, shall be liable for
the payment of any sums of money due for
rent at the time (.f taking such goods in execution, provided that such rent shall not
succeed one year's rent." And "after the
sale by the officer of any goods or chattels
as aforesaid, he shall first pay out of the
proceeds ofsuch sale the rent so due, and the
surplus, if any, he shall apply towards satisfying the judgment mentioned in such
execution." This statute of itself precludes
a recovery by the landlord, in any case, of
more thaA one year's rent, and in addition
to this a creditor's rights have attached,
which makes it more evident that the landlord could not recover more than one year's
'ent. The statement contained in 168 Pa.

50, would seem to indicate that if one of the
contingencies upon which the rent for the
entire term is to fall due has not occurred
before the right of the execution creditor
has attached, that the provision that only
one month's rent was payable in advance
would preclude the whole rent from becoming due, and payable in advance, but
upon the right of the execution creditor
eo instanti, the whole rent (subject to the
modification contained in thestatute, limiting it to rent for one year only) became
due.
In Trickett on Liens, Vol. 3, 585, it is
held that the landlord can claim priority
only for rent due at time of the levy, and
a case is cited, 2 C. C. 49. But there seems
to be a difference between the case there
cited and the one at bar, there the controversy being over rent which had become
due in the past, no provision being made
for rent payable in advance, and the lease
containing no provision, that upon the
happening of contingencies, similar to the
ones at bar, the rent for the entire term
should become instantly due and payable.
The same observations may be made on
Wickey v. Eyster, 58 Pa. 501, and Case v.
Davis, 15 Pa. 80. In 116 Pa. 371, Owens v.
Shovlin, there is a tacit admission that
when there is a provision in the lease, that
upon the happening of a contingency the
rent for the entire term shall become due,
the provision is valid and may be acted
upon, the doctrine of the case being, that
notwithstanding there is a provision in a
lease, that in the case of the removal of the
tenant from the premises during the term,
the whole rent unpaid should then become
due and collectible by distress or otherwise,
goods and chattels removed from the premises cannot be distrained, unless the removal was fraudulent and clandestine.
Thus implying that if the goods'are fraudulently and clandestinely removed, they
may, according to the provisions of the
lease, be distrained for the whole unpaid
rent, which is a tacit admission of this
principle.
Hence it seems that the provisions contained in this lease are allowable, and are
expres-ly upheld by the doctrine of the
Pennsylvania cases. But by reason of the
act of June 16, 18.6, the landlord cannot
collect rent in advance for more than one
year, so that Hudson could not collect the
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rent for his entire term.

Your auditors

therefore distribute the funds in the hands
of the sheriff as follows:
To Thos. Hudson, 1 year's rent ......
$300.00
To Cockroft ..................
.
130.00

$430.00
Which is respectfully submitted.
Wm. A. JORDAN,
Auditor.
OPINION OF COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.
The 83rd section of the act of June 16,
1836, 1 P. & L. 1954, directs that the goods
and chattels on land demised for years,
"taken by virtue of an execution and liable
to the distress of the landlord, shall be liable for the payment of any sums of money
due for rent at the time of taking such
goods in execution, provided that such
rent shall not exceed one year's rent."
On the Cockroft execution, a levy has
been made on the goods of Innes, which
were subject to the distress of his landlord,
Hudson. The rent that was then due, not
exceeding one year's, becomes payable out
of the proceeds. 1 Liens, 399; 3 Liens, 585.
An interval may elapse between the issue
of the execution and the levy, but it is the
date of the levy, not of the anterior issue
of the writ, that determines the amount of
rent payable from the proceeds. What
rent then was due when the Cockroftfi.fa.
was levied on the property of Innes?
The rent was to be paid monthly, in advance. When the execution was issued,
only the rent of three months and a portion
of a fourth month was unpaid. But, the
lease provided that if the lessee's property
should be levied on in execution, the rent
of the whole term should become instantly
payable. The very act of making the levy
made all the rent payable. In logical order,
the levy preceded the accrual of the whole
rent, but in time these two events were
simultaneous. We think that, if the arrangement thus precipitating the payableness of the rent is valid, as against the execution creditor, so much of the rent thus
becoming due as does not exceed one
month's must be paid out of the proceeds.
That such an arrangement is valid is, in
substance, decided in Johnson v. Peterson, 168 Pa. 47.
The learned auditors in allowing one
year's rent to the landlord have done right.
The exceptions to their report are therefore

dismissed, and the money in court will be
paid out in conformity with it.
PHILIP HARRIS vs. MOSES TYLER.
Assumpsit.
LLEWELLYN HILDRETH and J. PERRY
WOOD for the plaintiff;
A landlord may treat a tenant as holding
over from year to year or as a trespasser.Hemphill v. Flynn, 2 Pa. 444; Clinton and
Wire Cloth Co. v. Gardner, 99 Ill. App.
151.
Where landlord recognizes by acceptance of rent, he becomes thereby a
tenant from year to year upon conditions
of the original lease.-Alleu v. Bartlett, 20
W. Va. 46; Wolffe v. Wolffe, 69 Ala. 549;
Critchfield v. Ramley, 121 Neb. 178; Brown
v. Kayser, 60 Wis. 1; Phillip v. Manges, 4
Wharton, 225; Hollis v. Burns, 100 Pa. 209;
Diller v. Roberts, 13 S. & R. 59; McBrler
v. Marshall, 126 Pa. 390-396; Am. & Eng.
Encyc. Vol. 12, p. 67.
Surrender of the premises does not release tenant from liability for year's rent.
-Teller v. Boyle, 132 Pa. 56; McGunnagle
v. Thorton, 10 S. & R. 251; Brenckman v.
Turbill, 89 Pa. 58; Snyder v. Middleton
and Boggs, 4 Phila. 343; Fisher v. Milliken, 8 Barr. 120; Fire Extinguisher Co. v.
Branierd, 12 W. N. C. 473; Pie v. Carr, 69
Pa. 326.
Acceptance of key and release not conclusive of surrender.-Lane v. Nelson, 167
Pa. 602; Auer v. Penn, 99 Pa. 370. Quarter's rent was merely a part payment of
year's rent.-Hemphill v. Flynn, 2 Pa.
146; Lesley v. Randolph, 4 Rawle, 123;
Hollis v. Burns, 100 Pa. 209.
CHARLES R. WEEKS and GEO. ScHuYLER for the defendant.
Payment of rent not conclusive of a new
lease for ayear.-Wilcox v. Mountain Iron
& Steel Co., 147 Pa. 540.
Payment of one month's rent was not
conclusive of a renewal of the lease.-Cramer v. Bank, 2 Grant 267; Prindle v. Anderson, 19 Wendell, 394; Logan v. Herron,
8 S. & R. 4.59; Fitzpatrick v. Child, 6 Phila.
135.
STATEMENT OF FAOTS.

On March 1, 1894, the agent of Harris
leased a house in Shippensburg to Tyler,
for the space of two years, beginning April
1, 1894. This lease, which was written,
required either party to notify in writing
the other six weeks before April 1, 1896, of
his intention, the lessor to regain the premises, the lessee to retain them. The lessee
on such notice if not rejected having a
right to remain for another year. On Feb.
1, 1896, Tyler told the agent that he would
continue on the premises as a quarterly
tenant if Harris would permit. The agent
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remarked that he had no authority to
make lease after the expiration of the current one. Tyler remained in possession,
and on April 1st paid a quarter's rent. On
the 1st of July he tendered a quarter's rent
to Harris in person and at the same time
notified Harris that he was going to quit
the premises on the 30th of September.
Harris denied his right to do so. Tyler vacated the premises on September 27th, and
on the same day left the key at Harris'
house. Harris found a new tenant, to whom
he gave possession on Jan. 1, 1897, but the
rent payable by the new tenant was only
$200 a year, while Tyler was paying $350.
This assumpsit is by Harris to receive the
rent for the quarter, October-December,
and for the difference between $50 and
$87.50 for the quarter January-March. 1897.
OPINION OF COURT.

The question to be decided in this case
is whether the defendant., Moses Tyler,
who was the tenant of Philip Harris for the
term of two years under lease. and continued in possession after the expiration of
the said lease, is bound under the same
terms in the lease, or whether he is a quarterly tenant as claimed by the defendant.
The notice by parole given by Tyler two
months before April 1. 1896, to the agent
of Harris, who denied any authority to
make lease after the expiration of the current one, we believe to be a question of fact
whether such notice under the circumstances was notice to the principal or not,
and should go to the jury. The lease contained a covenant that if the landlord
wished to regain the premises at the expiration of the term, he was to give the tenant a written notice six weeks before April
1, 1896, if not rejected the tenant having
a right to remain for another year. The
fact that the tenant did not receive any
notice to quit and his remaining over creates an implied contract between the tenant and landlord, and incorporates the
terms of the former lease. There is no evidence of any agreement for different terms
for rent after the expiration of the lease;
and it was contended on the part of the
plaintiff, that on the defendant holding
over after the end of the second year according to the terms of the lease, the law
implied an agreement that he should pay
the same rent which he had agreed to pay

and had paid under the lease of the previous two years. "Such undoubtedly is the
general rule," says Tilghman, C. J., in Diller v. Roberts, 13 S. & R. 63; and Rogers,
J., in Phillips v. Manges, 4 Wharton, 229,
held "that if no new agreementbe entered
into, the law will presume, in the silence
of the parties, that the tenant holds the
premises subject to all such covenants contained in the original lease as applied to
his present situation."
The legal presumption of a renewal from
the holding over cannot be rebutted by
proof of a contrary intention on the part of
the tenantalone. "It wouldbe manifestly
unjust,'? says Mlercus, J., in Hollis v.
Burns, 100 Pa. 209, "to compel the lazidlord
against his will to assent to a renewal for
a shorter term as a will or caprice of his
tenant might dictate." And it is but just,
therefore, that the landlord should be at
liberty to take him at his offer, and consider his remaining as an assent on his
part to continue according to the terms of
the former lease and that such an agreement is implied by the law in many of the
c ses.-Hemphlll v. Flynn, 2 Pa. 144; Lesley v. Randolph, 4 Rawle 128.
The surrender of the premises by Tyler
on Sept. 27, 1896, and leaving the keys at
Harris' house was not effectual, since Harris denied his right to do so.-Auer v. Penn,
99 Pa. 375.
Nor did the renting of the premises to a
new tenant on Jan. 1. 1897, raise the presumption of an acceptance of a surrender.
Auer v. Penn, supra.
The landlord may allow the property to
stand idle, and hold the tenant for the entire rent; or he may lease it and hold him
for the difference.
In the case before us, the tenant held
over two quarters and paid two quarters'
rent and then vacated and insisted that he
was a quarter tenant and was bound no
longer.
The landlord contends that the defendant had become his tenant for the ensuing
year and he is entitled to rent for the quarter, October to December, and for the difference between $50 and $87.50 for the quarter,
January to March, 1897.
In this we think the landlord is right.
and judgment is awarded to the plaintiff.
RUEL U. CAPWELL.
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AMOS DEWALT vs. SAMUEL BURT.
Case .No. 1.-Tespass and ConversionProximate and remote cause-Counmel
fees.
Assumpsit.
GEo. W. AUBREY and J. Kmir BOSLER

for the plaintiff.
Defendant is guilty of technical conversion. "Dealing with another man's goods
without lawful authority may be an actionable wrong, notwithstanding the innocence of the mistake." Pollock on
Torts6 10 (S.J.) et. seq.; Bigelow on Torts,
238; arter v. Kingnian, 103 Iass. 517.
2. Defendant was bouid to exercise ordinary care. "The liability of a person
who negligently receives goods not directed to him, is the same as that of a
bailee for hire." :Newhall v. Paige, 76
Mass. 366; Hale on Bailtnents, 16.
3. Counsel fees and costs should be allowed. "Reasonable expenses incurred
in the effort to avoid consequences, is a
proximate course." Sedgwick on Damages,
77; Bennett v. Lockwood, 20 Wend. 223.
FRANK B. SELLERS and GEo. L. ScHuYLER for the defendant.
Defendant is responsible only for the
proximate results of his negligent act. Am.
& Eng. Ency. Vol. 16, pg. 428; Penna. R.
R. Co. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. K-3; Penna. R. R.
Co. v. Hope, 80 Pa. 373; Hoag & Alger
v. Lake Shore & Mich. R. R. Co., 85 Pa.
293. Defendant's negligent act was not
the proximate cause of Dewalt's loss, for
the results could not have been foreseen
by a man of ordinary prudence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Dewalt and Burt were on a car going
from Carlisle to Harrisburg; Dewalt had
with him an overcoat in the pocket of
which were three letters written to him
by Charles Fane concerning some transaction between them; which contained an
admission from Fane that he was indebted
to Dewalt to the extent of $500. The
overcoat Dewalt had drawn offand thrown
over the back of the seat. Burt who likewise had an overcoat, on hastily leaving
the car, took by mistake for his own, the
coat of Dewalt, and lost the papers from
the pocket. Dewalt subsequently obtained
the coat from him but never recovered the
papers. Some weeks after the trial was
had in the case of Dewalt v. Fane's Executors, and owing to the inability to prove
the liability of Fane, which he could in all
probability have proven by means of the
papers, Dewalt was non-suited. He sues
Burt, and seeks to recover the $500 al-

leged by him to have been lost in consequence of Burt's action; together with
counsel fees, $40, and $60 cost of suit.
CHARGE 09 COURT.

The defendant requests us to state to you,
gentlemen of the jury, that there is no liability on his part proven, and that, even if
there be some liability on him, there is
none for the $60 costs and $40 counsel fees.
In taking the overcoat and the contents
of its pocket, Burt committed a trespass.
He took the coat. He intended to take it.
He intended to take it because of the mistaken assumption that it was his own.
But his innocence of purpose did not excuse him in law. "Broadly speaking," says
Pollock, an eminent authority, "we touch
the property of others at our peril, and
honest mistake in acting for our own interest, or even an honest inteiltion to act
for the benefit of the true owner will avail
us nothing if we transgress.I '-Torts,
Webb's Ed. 412, 435; Cooley, Torts, 513;
Carkel v. Wakerman, 63 Cal. 34. If by an
accident, involving no negligence, Burt
had been unable to return the coat, he
would have been liable for its value. He
is, for the same reason, liable for the value
of the letters. Whether his negligence occasioned their loss or not does not appear.
Perhaps not. If instead of letters they had
been diamonds, their non-return, though
occasioned by loss, would have imposed on
Burt the duty of compensating Dewalt for
them.
But, what is their value? Is it the sum
of money which they would have assisted
Dewalt to recover? We think not. We
are to ascertain the value of the letters at
the time they were taken, or, at latest, at
the time they were definitively lost and it
was ascertained that they would not be returned. Atthat time it does not appear,
so far as the evidence shows, that their necessity for the recovery of the $500 was apparent. Fane's executor might pay the
debt. Some other evidence of admissions
by Fane of the existence of the debt might
be in existence. Had the letters been offered for stle it is not clear that Dewalt
would have paid for them $200 or $100.
He certainly would not have paid for them
$500. In no event, even with them, could
he recover more than $500. Hemight possibly recover all of that sum without them
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He might possibly fail to recover any of
thatsum with them. They would not have
been worth, even to him, more than a small
part of the maximum sum whose recovery
was possible in the action against Fane's
executor. Considered as a trespass or a
conversion, a deprivation of property, the
act of Burt did not, so far as appears, cause
a damage of $500.
May we consider the act as a negligence,
producing effects on the property of Dewalt? And if so, is Burt liable from that
point of view, for the $500? Had Dewalt
,had the letters he would probably have recovered the $500. They contained an
admission by Fane of his indebtedness.
Fane having died, Dewalt was not a competent witness to prove the contents of the
letters, and it does not appear that any other
person had knowledge of them. But, a
negligent pefson is liable not for all the
consequences of his act, but only for those
consequences which he might reasonably
have foreseen as likely to ensue. Passenger Railway Co. v. Trick, 117 Pa. 390;
Swanson v. Crandall, 2 8uper. 8.5. When
it is entirely clear that the consequence is
too remote, the court may,nay, must so say,
•as matter of law. That letters of any value
could be in the overcoat, could hardly be
expected. That the letter, if any, would
be the sole and indispensable means of
proving a fact, the proof of which would
be worth $500, was surely so improbable
that the non-realization of the possibility
of such a letter being in the pocket was
not reprehensible. We are obliged to say
that the $500 cannot be recovered,because of
the loss of the suit against Fane's executor,
and of the sequence of that loss upon the
act of Burt.
For the $40 counsel fees, there can be no
recovery. If the suit could not succeed
without the letter, it ought not to have
been instituted. Dewalt had no right to
bring a profitless action with the only possible effort -of increasing the liability of
Burt. Surely the bringing of an action
when it clearly appeared that it must fail
could not have been anticipated by Burt.
If the $500 were recovered, it would be impropertoadd $40 to it, as counsel fees, because had the action against Fane's executor succeeded, Dewalt would have been
compelled to pay the $40.
The $60 costs of suit cannot be recovered

for a reason already stated. It was idle to
bring the action without proof of the indebtedness of the defendant. That such a
suit would be brought, could not have
been anticipated by Burt.
We are obliged then to decline the instructions asked by the plaintiff. We
think, however, that the jury should ascertain the value of the letter, at the time of
the trespass on it, or of its conversion, and
should allow the sum of money representing it to the plaintiff. If any case the
plaintiff is entitled to a verdict for nominal
damages.
JAMES H. POTTER*v. ELIZABETH
LOOSE.
Case No. V.-Prineipaland Agent-Credibility of witness to be determined by
jury.
Assumpsit.
GEo. W. COLEs for plaintiff maintained:
1. That sale was between Potter and
Mrs. Loose and not as she alleges between
Potter and Mr. Loose.
2. That if sale was not between plaintiff
and Mrs Loose, the plaintiff is entitled to
recover, because Mrs. Loose by her statement and in conjunction with her husband
did through fraud injure this plaintiff to
the amount of $200.00.
WALTER B. FREED for defendant.
Mr. Loose, not possessing any authority
from Mrs. Loose to act as her agent, is
personally liable on the contract. Kroeger
v. Pitcairn, 101 Pa. 311; Feeter v. Heath,
11 Wend. 478; Simonds v. Heard, 23 Pick.
120; Tiffets v. Walker, 4 Mass. 595.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

In April A. D., 1896, the defendant
rented a stable for thepurposesof carrying
on a livery business from the plaintiff.
She bought all his stock, etc., for the price
or sum of $1,200 00. About six months
later the plaintiff came to the defendant,
Mrs. Loose, and stated that he had a cab,
sleigh, two horses, and a double harness
which he wanted to sell, and wanted
$200.00. Mrs. Loose told him that she had
enough to pay and that she would not
take the cab, etc., but that if he would see
her husband, Mr. L., that any arrangements he would make would have to be
satisfactory, but that she would not and
stated to him specifically that she would
never become responsible for the cab, etc.
Mr. Loose says that the plaintiff came
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to him and sold him the cab, etc., and
that he agreed to pay the sum of $200.00
for all. He says that he did not buy it
for his wife. That he was not acting as
ber agent in this deal. The plaintiff however contends that he had the entire deal
with Mrs. Loose and not with Mr. Loose.
It appeared in the evidence before the
Justice that Mt s. Loose owned all the
property, that she fed these horses, that
she once in a while used the cab for funerals, that she collected the bills for the
use of the cab, that the bills were made
out on her bill heads.
CHARGE OF THE COURT.

Gentlemen of the Jury:The action is founded on an alleged contract of sale of a cab, a sleigh, two
horses and a double harness, for the price
of $200.00. There seems to be no dispute
that a contract of sale, for this price, of
these articles was made. The plaintiff alleges that it was made with Elizabeth
Loose; she, that it was made with her husband. If it was in fact made with her
husband, he alone is liable upon it for the
price of the article sold. Upon that liability no effect is produced by any subsequent
disclosed relation of Mrs. Loose to the
property, She may with or without the
consent of her husband have had the use
of it. She may have fed the horses and
used the cab at funerals, and collected the
bills for the use of them. These acts
would not make her a party to the contract in which she did not participate, nor
by any species of novation, devolve on
her the liability for the price. The sole
question is, was the sale made to Elizabeth Loose, or was it made to Mr. Loose?
That it was male to the latter, Loose
himself testifies. He says he bought the
articles and agreed to pay $200.00 for them.
He denies that he acted for his wife. She
avers that she told Potter that she would
not take the cab, horse, etc. that she advised him to see Mr. Loose, that she
stated that any arrangements he should
make would have to be satisfactory; but
that she would never become responsible
for the price of the articles. If this testimony is believed by you, there can be no
verdict for the plaintiff.
On the other hand, Potter testifies that
he had no dealings with Mr. Lobse,

and that the contract was made with Mrs.
Loose alone. In connection with his testimony, the jury may consider the probability growing out of the relations of
the parties. Mrs. Loose was conducting
the livery business. She had bought horses
and other stock. The cab, sleigh, horses
and harness were articles suitable to her
trade. She fed these horses. She used
the cab at funerals and received competition for it. In such cases, the evidence is
for the consideration of the jury. The
credibility of the respective witnesses
must be determined by you. If you
think that the Looses testify truly, your
verdict must be for thedefendant. If you
believe the plaintiff, in view of the facts
disclosed, you will return a verdict for
him.
ELIZABETH LOOSE vs. JAMES H.
POTTER.
Case No. 2 .
Assumpsit.
W. M. FLANIGAN for the plaintiff.
Mutual releases are the consideration for
the new contract, and are sufficient to give
it full effect.-Cutter v. Cochrane, 16 Mass.
408; Rollins v. Marsh, 128 Mass. 116; MeCreery v. Day, 119 N. Y. 1; McNish v.
Reynolds, et. al., 95 Pa. 483.
B. FRANK FENTON for defendant.

Plaintiff cannot recover on account of
the uncertainty of the agreement.-Clark
on Contracts, 63.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Mrs. Loose entered into an agreement to
rent the stable of the defendant, Mr. Potter, in April, 1896. In the lease for the
stable it was stipulated that the defendant
was to keep two of his horses there and
was to pay $25 per month for their keeping. Later on, the defendant found that
the price was too great.as he had hishorses
away from town frequently, and they then
made a verbal agreement that the plaintiff
was to keep the two horses, or as many as
the defendant brought there at the price
or sum of 15 cents per meal. Each meal
would have cost Mrs. Loose 10 cents. The
defendant promised in the presence of witnesses that he would keep from two to five
horses there. The lease expired on the 15th
day of September, 1898. Mr. Potter took
his horses away from the stable on the 1st
day of Marbh, 1898.
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Is the plaintiff entitled to recover damages for feed, etc., from the 1st day of
March, 1898, to the 15th day of September,
1898? If so, what damages will there be?
Can the plaintiff bring suit for the breach
of a verbal contract, or for any contract not
under seal?
CHARGE OF THE COURT.

Gentlemen of the Jury:
James H. Potter in his lease of the stable
to Elizabeth Loose, agreed to keep his
horses in the stable and to pay her for
their feed $25 per month. He was released
from this obligation, on his agreeing, as
she alleges, to keep from two to five horses
there during the term of the lease paying
per meal 1.5 cents. This agreement, if it
was made, was binding upon him. The
consideration for it was the extinction of
his subsisting obligation. You will first
determine whether the agreement was in
fact made.
If it was made, it is not pretended by
the defendant that he has kept it. It is
uncontested thlat between March 1, 1898,
and Sept. 15, 1898, no horses of Potter were
kept in the stable. Nor is itdisputed that
the meal for which Mrs. Loose was to receive fifteen cents, would cost her only
ten cents, so that her profit on each meal
would be five cents. You have therefore
the data by means of which the loss to Mrs.
Loose arising from Potter's breach of contract may be ascertained.
If you find that the agreement was made
and broken by 2%r. Potter, it will be your
duty to find a verdict for the plaintiff for
what you shall discover to have been the
profit, lost to her, by reason of the breach
of contract.
SAMUEL DUCKWORTH vs. HORACE
GIBSON.
Case No. 3.-Boroughordinance-- Validity
qf-Reasonable-Re-straint of TradeSeizure of goods by constable.
Trespass.
MERKEL LANDIS and W. J. HENRY for
the plaintiff contended that the ordinance
is invalid.
1. Does not conform to the laws and
the constitution of Pa. and U.S. Kneidler v. Norristown, 100 Pa. 368; Phillips v.
Allen, 41 Pa. 481.

2. It is unreasonable. Davis v. Doylestown, 3 Pa. 573.
3. Allows an act to one and forbids it to
another. Danville v. Peters, 8 Luz. Leg.
Reg. 273; Conshohocken v. Fennel, 4 Mont.
25.
4. It is in restraint of trade. Millerstown v. Bell, 123 Pa. 151.
A. FRANK JOHN and WENCIL HARTMAN for the defendant.
1. The prohibition which precluded the
bringing in of milk from farms in a designated districtis not one in "restraint of
trade" but rather one of necessity. See
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, and
cases therein cited.
2. The constable is an officer acting
under authority of the state. McJunkin,
Appellant v. Mathers, 158 Pa. 137.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The borough of Shippensburg passed an
ordinance that no milk furnished by cows
kept on farms in a designated district,
should be sold in its limits, on pain of a
fine of five dollars and confiscation of the
milk. The motive for this ordinance was
several cases of typhoid fever among persons who were supplied with milk from
the banned district, and the opinion of
three-fourths of the physicians in town,
that the milk was the vehicle of the disease
germs. On Oct. 3, 1897, in pursuance of
this statute, Gibson, high constable of the
borough, seized twenty quarts of milk of
Duckworth, worth $1.50. For the dam.,
ages, thus suffered, Duckworth, denying
the legality of the seizure, brings this trespass. A verdict for the plaintiff was
taken, subject to a reserved point, whether
on the whole evidence there was any
ground for a recovery.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The seizure by Gibson of Duckworth's
milk was illegal, unless it was authorized
by an ordinance, and unless that ordinance
was valid. The seizure seems to have been
in accordance with the terms of the ordinance. It remains then, only to consider
whether the ordinance itself is invalid.
It is assailed by the plaintiff on several
grounds.
(1). It is alleged to be in excess of the
power of the borough, because, it prescribes
a forfeiture of the milk. It seems to be
established that a municipality has no
power to prescribe the forfeiture of a
specific thing, as a penalty for the breach
of its ordinance, unless that power.is ex-
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pressly conferred by the legislature. In
Phillips v. Allen, 41 Pa. 481, the forfeiture
of eight baskets of apples, for the failure of
the owner to have the cubical contents of
the basket marked upon it, as an ordinance
of Philadelphia required, was declared unlawful, because the city had "no power to
inflict any such punishment in this form."
To the same effect is I Dillon, Alunic, Corp.
section 345; Kneedler v. Borough of Norristown, 100 Pa. 368. The act of 18.51, in
paragraph 21, section 2, confers on boroughs the power of imposing fines and
penalties "incurring partial or total forfeitures.'
If the borough of Shippensburg
was subject to this act, we think it might
lawfully denounce a forfeiture of the milk
for a breach of the ordinance, if that ordinance was not otherwise objectionable.
We have not been shown, however,
whether Shippensburg has been subjected
to the act of 1851, and we cannot assume
that it has been. The ordinance is therefore invalid.
2. Again, the ordinance is assailed on the
ground that the prohibition in it is unreasonable. The prohibition of the sale of impure or disease-producing milk would be
within the competence of council. The
ordinance in question has this object in
view. Is an unreasonable method adopted
in it in order to effect this object? A certain district being under suspicion, an
embargo on the sfle of milk furnished by
cows in that district has been laid.' It is
possible that some milk entirely wholesome is embraced within the prohibition.
Does this circumstance condemn the ordinance? We think not. In the oleomargarine law, the sale of oleomargarine
is forbidden on the pretext that much
of it Ls unwholesome, or that much of
it would be palmed off on buyers as butter. In order to prohibit a certain percentage of frauds, or sales of impure material,
a universal prohibition is laid. The act of
assembly was not condemned as having no
real or substantial relation to the objects
expressed in its title.-Powell v. Penn , 127
U. S. 678. It must be conceded that the
courts will more freely exercise ajudgment
as to the reasonableness of the policy of an
ordinance than as to that of the policy of
a statute. We do not. however, think that
the exclusion of all milk from a suspected
neighborhood is so apparently unreason-

able as to require the condemnation of the
ordinance.
3. It is objected against the ordinance
that it was enacted without sufficient investigation into the grounds of suspicion.
What evidence was before the council, we
do not know. Several cases of typhoid fever had happened among persons supplied
with milk from a certain district. Apparently there were no cases among those deriving their milk supply elsewhere. The
opinions of three-fourths of the physicians
of the town were obtained, and they concurred as to the milk being the vehicle of
the disease. We are not able to say that
the evidence before the council was inadequate to justify their legislation. Mfore
drastic measures are pardonable,.where the
object is to prevent the spread of so serious
a disease as typhoid fever, than would be
permissable under a less urgent state of
things.
4. The ordinance punishes an attempted
sale of milk from the condemned district,
with fine and confiscation. Gibson the
constable simply seized the milk of the
plaintiff,on iis assumption that it belonged
to the prohibited class. Duckworth has
been finally deprived of it without the opportunity to contest the accuracy of this
assumption. No forfeiture is lawful, unldss it is preceded by an adjudication,
after notice to the owner. Craig v. Kline,
65 Pa. 399; Felter v. Wilt,46 Pa. 460.
An ordinance in an Ohio municipality
authorized the marshall to seize and impound hogs, and, without notice to their
owner, directed them to be sold. It was
held to be "as contrary to the spirit of the
charter, as it is alien from the general
genius of our institutions." Rosebaugh v.
Laffin, 110 Ohio, 32. 1 Dillon, Mlunic.
Corp. 317. et seq. In McJunkin v. Mathers, 158 Pa. 137, a cow running at large in
the streets of the borough of Butler, was
seized and impounded, under an ordinance authorizing the seizure and sale of
cattle thus running at large. It does not
appear whether the ordinance provided for
a hearing. The attempt was to wrest the
cow from the possession of the constable by
the action of replevin. So far as it appears, the allowance of a hearing was intended, before a sale of the cow should be
made. The decision was that the legality
of the seizure could be ascertained only by
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the action of trespass, and not by that of
replevin, because replevin could not,
under the act of April 3, 1779, he brought
against an "officer acting in his office
under the authority of the state."
The reserved point therefore must be
answered in favor of the plaintiff and
judgment will be entered on the verdict.
COMMONWEALTH vs. THOMAS
TATE.
Case No. 4.-Lareeny-Insufficient evidence.
Appeal for new trial.
LLEWELLYN HILDRETH and FRANK J.
LAUBENSTEIN for the appellants.
1. Naked possession of stolen property
unexplained is notper seprimafacie evidence that the possessor is guilty of larceny. Best on Evidence, 224-226.
2. In order to convict upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances should be
strong and the result of the whole leave
no doubt that the offence has been committed and that the accused and no other
could have committed it.-4 Am. & Eng.
Ency. of Law, pp. 858; People v. Foley, 7
West R. 344.
JOHN G. MILLER and CHAS. G. MOYER
for the commonwealth.
1. The general rule is that when a larceny has been committed, the recent, absolute and unexplained possession of the
stolen property raises a presumption to the
guilt of the person who has that possession,
sufficient to warrant a conviction. 12 Am.
and Eng. Enc. of Law, p. 845; Commonwealth vs. Thomas Deegan, 138 Mass. 182;
The State vs. Jennings, 81 Mo. 188;Knickerbocker vs. the People, 43 N. Y. 177.
2. Since the facts of this case were submitted to a jury and passed upon by them,
this court ought not to grant a new trial
unless for some valid reason.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
At a trial of Tate for the larceny of a
watch, Jacob Hobbs testified that he went
into Tate's house, in his absence and without his authority, went to his bureau and
rummaged through its contents and found
the watch among them. The watch had
belonged to Jacob Ewing, and was taken
from him four days before Hobbs found it
in Tate's house. There was no other evidence of Tate's guilt, and despite the objection by his counsel to the admission of
the watch in evidence and of the testimony
of Hobbs, the jury were allowed to render
a verdict of guilty. Motion for a new trial

OPINION OF THE COURT.

Tate has been convicted of the crime of
larceny and we are now asked to set aside
the verdict on the ground that it was not
founded on sufficient evidence.
The watch of Ewing was stolen from him.
So much is uncontested. But by whom?
To justify a conviction of Tate, the clearest
proof of the stealing is, it is needless to say,
inqufficient unless it is accompanied by adequate evidence of the participation of the
defendant in the theft. Hobbs testifies
that he went into Tate's house, and in his
absence and without his authority, examined the drawer of his bureau, and found
among its contents the stolen watch. This
discovery was but four days after the theft.
Is this evidence sufficient?
1. It is not insufficient because reposing
on the veraciousness of one witness. All
the elements of most crimes may be made
out by the unsupported testimony of one
man. As the actual taking of the watch
could have been proven by the testimony
of one witness, so may the fact or facts
from which such taking is inferrible.
2. The discovery by Hobbs was the result of a trespass. He entered Tate's house
without authority either from Tate or from
the agent of the law. He had no search
warrant. He rummagod through the contents of the bureau. This conduct was
grossly reprehensible. But were the watch
and the testimony of Hobbs, for this reason, inadmissible? We think not. While
no relevant case in Pennsylvania has been
called to our attention, the question has
been considered in other states. In Com.
v. Dana, 2 Mete. 329, Wilde, J., says, "Admitting that the lottery tickets and materials were illegally seized, still this is no
legal objection to the admission of them in
evidence. If the search-warrant were illegal, or if the officer serving the warrant
exceeded his-authority, the party on whose
complaint the warrant issued, or the officer,
would be responsible for the wrongdoing;
but this is no good reason for excluding
the papers seized as evidence, if they were
-pertinentto the issue, as they unquestionably were. When papers are offered in
evidence, the court can take no notice how
they were obtained, whether lawfully or
unlawfully, nor would * * * [it]
form a collateral issue to determine that question."
Cf. Com. v. Smith, 108 Mass. 370; Legatt
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v. Tollerney, 14 East, 302; Williams v.
Smith, (Ga.) 39 L. R. A. 269. The evidence
was not to be rejected because it was obtained by means of a trespass.
The only evidence of the theft of the
watch by Tate, is its being found in the
bureau drawer, four days after it was
taken from Ewing. Is this sufficient? Of
possession by the accused of a stolen article, Best says, "but even when standing
alone, it will in many cases raise a pre.sumption of guilt, sufficient to cast on the
accused the onus of showing that he came
honestly by the stolen property, and in
default of his so doing, it will warrant the
jury in convicting him as the thief."
Evidence, p. 209. To produce this result,
the possession must be recent after the
theft; and it must be exclusive. In
Knickerbocker v. The People, 43 N. Y.
177, Peckham J., says, "We think it well
settled law that the exclusive possession
of the whole or some part of stolen property
by the prisoner recently after the theft, is
sufficient, when standing alone, to cast
upon him the burden of explaining how
he came by it, or of giving some explanation, and if he fails to do so, to
warrant the jury in convicting him
Cf. Connecticut v.
of the larceny."
Weston, 9 Conn. 527; Commonwealth v.
Deegan, 138 Mass. 182. Although Greenleaf, Vol. 3, 31, says that standing alone
"its value or persuasive power is very
slight" and that other circumstances
must be added, such as the defendant's
false statements concerning the possession,
his attempt to obliterate marks on the article stolen, or to dispose of it, we think
the weight of authority supports the proposition of Best. The recent and exclusive
possession of stolen goods will support a
conviction of the larceny, unless it is explained consistently with innocence. Was,
the possession by Tate of the Ewing watch
recent? We think it was. The possession
of pigeons, 13 days after they were stolen,
was held sufficiently recent in Commonwealth v. Deegan, 138 Mass. 182. Four
days is so short a time as to make improbable the purchase of the watch from a
third person, within that time.
Was the possession of Tate exclusive?
"If" says Best, "for instance, the articles
stolen were found on the person of the accused, or in a locked-up house or room, or

in a box of which he kept the key, there
would be fair ground for calling on him
for a defense; but if they were found lying
in a house or room in which he lived
jointly with others equally capable with
himself of having committed the theft, or
in an open box to which others had access, this would raise no definite presumption of his guilt." Evidence, p. 211.
Says Greenleaf, "If they (the stolen articles) are found upon premises owned or occupied as well by others as himself, or in a
place to which others have equal facility
and right of access, there seems no good
reason why he, rather than they, should
be charged upon this evidence alone." 1
Evidence, par. 33. The evidence before
the jury did not show that Tate had exclusive possession of the watch. Had he
a wife? Had he sons? Did any one not a
member of his family, occupy the house,
and have access to the bureau drawer? It
is incumbent on the commonwealth, when
it relies on the possession of the stolen
article, as proof that it was stolen by the
defendant, to establish all the qualities of
that possession. It must show the recency; it must show the exclusiveness, of
it. In the latter respect, the evidence
was fatally deficient. It would be hazardous to permit a conviction without further
light on the nature of Tate's possession.
The verdict must therefore be set aside,
and a new trial awarded.
JAMES SWANSON vs. WILLIAM
HOWE.
Case No. 5-Guardian and ward-Oil
part of realty-Lease transending minority of ward is a sale-Contractnot
divisible.
Ejectment.
D. EDWARD LONG and THOS. .M. McCACHRAN for appellants.
1. Where an agreement is illegal in part
only, the part which is good may be enforced, provided it can be separated from
the part which is bad. Clark on Contracts,
p. 474: Robinson v. Green, 3 Met. 159; Erie
Railway Co. v. Express Co., 35 N. J. L.
240; Presbury v. Fisher, 18 Mo. 50; Langdell's Cases on Contracts, Part 1, p. 40], etc.
2. It is the guardian's duty to lease his
ward's lands, but the lease is binding only
during the ward's minority and if made
for a longer period is voidable at the option
of the ward after his majority. Hughes'
Minor's App., 53 Pa. 500; Putnam v.
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Ritehie, 6 Paige 399; Snook v. Sutton, 5
Halstead 133; Van Dorens v. Everitt, 5 N.
J. L. 460.
3. The plaintiff not having right of
possession, the action of ejectment does
not lie. Stevens on Pleading.
Miss JULIA A. RADLE and ISAIAH
SCHEELINE for appellees.
1. The guardian cannot lease oil or
mineral land for the purpose of working
out the product, as such lease extends to
something more than the mere usufruct.
Stoughton's Appeal, 88 Pa. 198.
2. It is the guardian's duty to lease his
ward's lands for the term of his guardianship, but any excess in lease beyond that
term will be void at the election of his
successor or of the ward on becoming of
age. Emerson v. Spicer, 46 N. Y. 594;
Mullen v. Bemer, 69 Ill. 108; Matter of
Himes, 105 N. Y. 563.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Peter Swanson, who owed in fee a tract
of land, adapted to agriculture but which
had petroleum below the surface, devised
it to his son James in fee. The guardian
of James made a lease ot the farm to
Howe for sixteen years, that is, until
James should reach his twenty-fifth year.
He also granted in this lease, so much of
the oil below as Howe should be able to
take out, Howe paying in addition to $240
per year, ten cents per barrel for every
barrel of oil extracted. Bowe entered on
the land, and operated the wells for ten
years, when, a new guardian being appointed, the latter brought an ejectment
against.Howe, to receive poksession of the
farm, including the oil.
The court below having permitted
Swanson by his guardian to recover, the
appeal to the Supreme Court was taken.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
When James Swanson was nine years
old, his guardian leased his farm for the
period of sixteen years, or until he should
attain his twenty-fifth year. We know
not how this guardian was appointed. He
may have been designated by the will of
Peter Swanson, the devisor. He may
have been appointed by the Orphans'
court. In the former case, he could not
be superseded on the selection of another,
by the minor, on his reaching the age of
fourteen. A new guardian was, however,
for some cause appointed, and lie contests
thevalidity of the lease made to the defendant, William Howe.

1. It is alleged that the lease is voidable
by the guardian, because the term attempted to be created by it, transcends
the minority of the ward. A distinction
is drawn between a lease and a sale of
land, and while the guardian may make
leases, at his discretion, without submitting them to the approval (if the orphans'
court, Stoughton's Appeal, 88 Pa. 198, lie
cannot sell the ward's land without subh
approval. See. 31, Act March 29, 1832, 2
P. & L. 3315; Johns v. Tiers, 114 Pa. 611.
A sale by a guardian, without the approval
of the orphans' court is voidable by him.
He may subsequently sell the land again
with its approval to another purchaser,
and the later purchaser will have the
better title. Stoughton's Appeal, 88 Pa.
198. What then is the difference between
a lease and a sale? The lease might be for
one, or three, or five, or ten, or one hundred, or one thousand years. Are we to
say that a conveyance in fee simple, by the
guardian, would be voidable by him, and
not unconditionally good, until the majority of the ward, Stoughton's Appeal;
but that a lease for one thousand years
would be voidable, only for the period exceeding the minority of the ward? We
think not. A lease for a very long term
is practically equivalent to a sale in fee,
and we think there is the same necessity
for the approval of the orphans' court, and
that the consequence of the non-procurement of that approval would be the same.
The lease, like the grant in fee, would be
voidable even within the ward's minority.
But, by what criterion as to the length
of the term, are we to decide that the
lease is to be considered a sale? Will the
making of a lease for five years, or for
eight, be beyond the competence of the
guardian. Such leases are sometimes made
by him: Thackray's Appeal, 75 Pa. 132.
If they terminated before or at the majority of the ward; i. e. at the expiration of
the guardian's power, they may be wholesome and wise. If they exceed that period,
We think they must be treated as sales,
and that without the approval of the
orphans' court, they remain voidable at
all times. The lease of James Swanson's
land was unusually long, and it stretched
four years beyond his minority. We
think it nmust be regarded as a sale, voidable because there was no approval of it
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by the court. If this is not voidable, we
see no reason for holding that a lease for
thirty-two or for sixty-four years, would
be.
We have found no authority upon the
point In 9 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 115, it is
said that "Any excess in a lease beyond
that term [i. e. the term of the guardianship of the guardian who made it] will be
void at'the election of his successor, or of
the ward on becoming of age." None of
the authorities cited however, which we
have had an opportunity to consult, decide
that it is not voidable by the guardian who
made it. We think it better to say that
whether a lease shall be deemed a sale or
not, in the sense of our statutes, depend on
its transcending or not transcending, the
term of the ward's minority.
2. The lease demises the surface of the
land for agricultural purposes, but also so
much of the oil as the lessee might extract
during the term. This is, therefore, an
absolute sale of the oil. Now the oil is a
part of the realty. Stough ton's Appeal. 88
Pa. 198; Marshall v. Mellon, 179 Pa. 371;
Blakely v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 42-5. The socalled lease of it being in substance a sale,
was voidable unless it had the approval of
the orphans' court. Stoughton's Appeal,
88 Pa. 198; Wilson v. Hughes (W. Va.) 39
L. R. A. 292. As the lessee had no right
to continue in possession of the land for
mining purposes, it may be recovered from
him by the action ofejectment. Buchanan
v. Hazzard, 95 Pa. 240.
But may the lessee be deprived of the
possession of the surface? The answerdepends on the severability of that part of
the lease pertaining to the surface from
that part pertaining, to the oil. We do
not think them severable. It does notappear that the surface wouhli have been
leased at all but to one purchasing the
oil, nor that it would have been leased
for $240 per year, but for the royalty expected from the oil. We think the lease
indivisible, and that it is altogether voidable by the guardian who made it, or by
his successor in the trust. There is no
error in the record.
Judgment affirmed.

HUGHES vs. JACKMAN.
Case.No. 6.-Tortious act-Legitimacy of
an act-Malice-Operationon mind decisive element in tort-Injury by a trick.
Motion for a compulsory non-suit.
S. H. M LLER and B. J. MACEwEN for
plaintiff.
1. One who wantonly or negligently
causes property to be exposed to dangers
which he knew, or which ordinary forecast and prudence might have foreseen, is
responsible for damages resqlting therefrom though his act may not have been
the most proximate cause. McGrew et.
at. v. Stone, 3 P. F. Smith, 442; Scott et.
al. v. Hunter et. al., 10 Wright 194;
Township of W. Mah. v. Watson, 112 Pa.
574; Metallic Compression Casting Co. v.
Fetchburg R. R. Co, 109 Mass. 277.
2. Where any doubt exists as to the
proximity of cause, the proper course is to
submit the question for decision of the
jury. 19 Am. & Eng. Enc. 302.
1. Defendant was not under a duty to
disclose the presence of a fire. Laidlaw v.
Organ, 2 Wheaton, 177; Wesott v.
Wright, 4 Gray 461; Kitznig v. McElrath,
5 Pa. 467; People's Bank of N. Y. v. Bogart
81 N. Y. 101; Williams v. Sparr, 24 Mich.
336.
2. Defendant's act was not the proximate cause of the destruction of the barn.
Ry. Co. v. Trick, 117 Pa. 390; Twp. of
West Mahanoy v. Watson, 112 Pa. 574.
Hoag & Alger'v. Lake Shore & Michigan
Southern Ry. Co., 85 Pa. 293.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Hughes and Jackman were rival livery
stable keepers in the town of Mechanicsburg. On February 3, 1898, when Hughes
was nearing the stables of Jackman, he
saw that they were on fire. Instead of attempting to extinguish the flames, as he
then easily could have done he walked on.
A short distance away he met Jackman,
and in order to prevent Jackman reaching
his stables in time to put out the fire, he
feigned an engagement for him at a point
two miles in the country and the two
went together to this point. The consequence was that the fire made such headway as to be inextinguishable and Jackman suffered a loss of $750.00.
Defendant not denying the evidence of
plaintiff moves the court for a compulsory
non-suit.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The right which Jackman has violated,
if he has indeed violated any right, is the
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right of Hughes not to suffer an injury to
his property by a cause whose operation
would have been arrested but for an act
performed by Jackman for the very purpose of preventing his knowledge of the
operation of this cause, and his interference
with its operation, and for the ulterior purpose that this injury should be accomplished.
Hughes' stables were afire. The progress
of the combustion would involve serious
destruction of property. For the fire Jackman is not responsible. He did not cause
it. The feelings with which he contemplated it may have been discreditable. He
may have seen in it a cause of damage to
a rival, an( an agency which would probably relieve him of a disagreeable competition. However morally reprehensible,
these feelings could not be a ground of
action.
Had the good will towards their neighbors that ordinarily dwells in human
hearts dwelt in his, he would probably
have extinguished the fire.
He could
easily have done so. He chose not to do
so because the usual kindliness of man for
man had given way to envious satisfaction
in the calamity of his rival. Still we are
not able to persuade ourselves that his refusal to put out the fire, considered in itself
or in conjunction with the baseness of his
motive, furnishes to Hughes a cause of
action.
Hughes, however, was walking towards
his stables, and would have probably
reached them in time to put out the fire,
when he was met by Jackman. Jackman
conceives a plan of preventing Hughes'
continuing his walk. This plan he executes and it is successful. Hughes is diverted from his course and the fire destroys
the buildings. If Jackman had induced
Hughes to turn aside and go into the country with him without knowledge of the
fire, and therefore without sinister intent,
his action, however disastrous in its results
to Hughes, would support no legal liability.
But the turning aside of Hughes was
achieved in order to prevent an arrest of
the fire, and it produced the designed effect.
Did Jackman do a wrong in offering an inducement to Hughes to do an act which
had serious consequences for him, for the
mere purpose of producing these consequences?

The tortious nature of many acts depends on the subjective state of the agent.
For some acts liability depends on the
care or negligence, causing or accompanying them. In many cases of fraud, the
intention to deceive is a pre-condition to
liability. A man may make certain uses
of his property, although they hurt his
neighbor, if no malevolent feeling inspires
them, whereas, he will be responsible, if
he has performed them in order to produce
the hurt. Jackman doubtless had a right
to induce Hughes to go into the country.
It by no means follows that he had aright
maliciously to induce him to go into the
country. It would be unwise to cast a
civil responsibility on a man for persuading another to do an act which is, in its
results, detrimental, simply because it is
detrimental. It would not at all be unreasonable to make him liable, for such results when they were sought by him, and
the act which he induced, he induced in
order to effect them. A man may destroy a
spring on his neighbor's lands, created by
percolations, as a result of a legitimate use
of his own land; but not if he does the acts
on his own land which cut it off, merely
for the purpose of cutting it off. Wheatley
v. Baugh, 2.5 Pa. 528; Lybes Appeal, 106
Pa. 626; Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa.
514. In Hoy v. Sterrett, 2 W. 327, where
the owner of a lower mill sued the owner
of an upper mill, for diminishing the
quantity of water, the supreme court approved the instruction of the trial court to
the jury that if the detention of water arose
from the ordinary and proper use of it for
mill purposes, it was damnum absque
injuria, "but if the water was detained
carelessly or maliciously to the injury of
Hoy, the plaintiffwas entitled to recover."
The legitimacy of any act, therefore may
-depend on the nature of the object or purpose with which it is done. We think
that, innocent as the beguiling of Hughes
into the country would have been, had it
not been inspired by malice, it becomes
tortious on account of its motive and its
consequence.
If Jackman had caused the beginning of
the fire, he would have been guilty of a
wrong. If he had caused its continuance,
he would have been equally guilty. He
could cause its continuance by furnishing
fuel to it, or by letting a draft of air on it.
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He could cause its continuance, by preventing the application of water or other
extinguishing agency to it. Had he while
firemen were endeavoring to put out the
flames, cut their hose, wrecked their engine, used force to thwart them, he would
have been answerable to Hughes. He
would have been equally so, had he induced them to desist, solely for the object
of completing the destruction of the property of Hughes. Hughes was aboutto extinguish the tire. A persuasion was offered
him, which prevented the extinguishment, and whose sole purpose was to prevent it. We think the act tortious and
civilly actionable.
Ve are not without examples of the
operation on the mind, being the decisive
element of a tort. To induce A to injure
himself by the act of paying for a thing
which he would not buy but for the inducement, if the inducement is known to
be false, is to commit a wrong to A. A
may be induced to hurt himself otherwise
than by a purchase or sale, and other inducements thai erroneous beliefs may be
employed. The difference in these respects
an hardly be material. Hughes was induced to do an act whose consequences
were disastrous to him. He was so induced, in order that those consequences
might be accomplished. And a trick was
employed as the means of inducing him.
There are cases in which an injury to a
man, through the voluntary act of another,
is visited on a third man who induced that
act by a trick. In Rice v. Manley, 66 N.
Y. 82, a purchaser was disappointed of his
purchase, by a false inducement to the
seller to sell them to a third person. The
latter was therefore liable to the buyer. In
Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. 385, -a seller of
hogs lost the sale by a trick whereby the
buyer was induced to buy hogs from a
third person. He had a remedy against
such person. Hughes was injured by a
trick perpetrated on himself, whereby he
was induced to do an act detrimental to
himself. We think he has an action
against Jackman.
The motion for a compulsory nonsuit is
overruled.

PHILIP MORRIS vs. HATTER
ESTATE.
Case No. 7.- Will-Admissibitity of e'idence to show the creation of a trust.
P. H. Smrx -r for plaintiff.
Intention of testator is as laid down in
the will, parol evidence cannot change the
face of the will.-Jarmon on Wills, 726729; Jarnion on Wills, Vol. 1, p. 708.
Parol declarations of testator insufficient
in law to establish a trust.
Parol declarations of devisee only admissable when followed by a proof of fraud.
Hoge v. Hoge, 1 Watts 163.
FRED D. OiLER and CHARLES SHAM33AUGH for defendant.
Parol evidence may be admitted to show
the declarations of a trust in a will. Jarmon on Wills, 1 Vol. p. 724; Hoge v. Hoge,
1 Watts 163; 'McKee v. Jones, 6 Pa. 425.
Passive trust created. Am. & Eng.
Encyc. Vol. 27, p. 6; Dodson v. Bell, 60 Pa.
492; Fisher v. Wister, 154 Pa. 65.
ESTATE OF JOHN HATTER, DECEASED.

Hatter's will bequeathed $2,000 to Philip
Morris, and contained other devises. Before the auditor appointed to distribute
the assets, it was shown that Morris had
admitted that he was the mere recipient
for the W. C. Allison Iemorial church,
and that he had agreed with Hatter, that
though his name should appear in the
will, he would regard himself as a trustee
for the church. This was shown by a
witness who was present at the directions
given by Hatter to the scriveners, for the
making of the will, and by another who
testified to admissions of Morris before
and after Hatter's death. To the auditor's award of the $2,000 to the church
Morris excepts.
Three questions present themselves. (1)
Can it be shown by evidence dehors the
will, that an apparently absolute bequest
to a legatee, is affected by a trust in favor
of another. (2) Is the evidence of such a
trust in this case adequate, and (3) Does it
follow, from Morris' being a trustee that
the money should be paid to the church
and not to him?
(1) Wills are by statute, required to be
in writing. When a bequest is alleged to
have been made, the thing bequeathed,
and the person to whom it is given, must
be named. It would be impossible to supply either by extraneous evidence. It
would seem logically to follow that when
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a person is named as legatee, it could not
be shown that some other person was intended or that when the words employed
by the testator, import an absolute bequest to the legatee, it could not be
shown that he was a mere receptacle of
the gift, for the benefit of another. Precedents, however, show that this view is
erroneous. It is competent to show that
though land or money is given to X, in
terms that naturally import that he is to
take it for his own benefit, it was so
given, on.his express oral agreement with
the testator to take it as trustee for some
other person. Thus in Hoge v. Hoge, 1
W. 163, a devise was made to John Hoge.
It was shown that the testator made the
devise in consequence of John Hoge's
agreement to receive the land, for the
benefit of William Hoge, a natural son of
the testator. In Hoffner's Estate, 161 Pa.
331, a bequest was made to A, on a promise
by A, at her death, to bequeath the sum
of $1,000 to certain churches. It is said
that equity would declare and enforce a
trust in such a case. Cf. McAuley's Estate, 184 Pa. 124; Hodnett's Estate, 154
Pa. 48.3, 489; Schultz's Estate 80 Pa.. 396.
(2) Is the evidence of a trust in Morris
adequate? The fact that it is parol does
not preclude reliance on it. Even devises
can be affectedwith a trust by oral evidence.
-Hoge v. Hoge, supra; afortioribequests.
The evidence is furnished by two witnesses.
One of these was present at the interview
between the testator and the scrivener, and
he testifies to a promise there made by Morris, that if his name should appear as legatee in the will, he would regard himself as
trustee for the church. Had he not been
thus present, and. by his promise, induced
the nomination of him as legatee, no trust
would have arisen.-Schultz's Estate, supra. The mere fact that when, after the
death of Hatter, he was informed of his desire, he expressed the purpose to carry it
out, would not have given rise to an enforceable trust. The other witness disclosed
admissions by MorrLs, before Hatter's
death, that he was legatee in trust for the
church, and similar admissions made after
Hatter's death. The evidence is as strong
as that which was deemed sufficient in the
cases cited.
(3) But, as the bequest is to Morris,
should not the money be paid to him?

Should it be assumed that he will not execute the trust? He is a mere dry trustee,
having nothing to do with the fund but to
pay it over instantly. It would be useless
to put it into his hands, in order simply
that he should at once pass it over to the
church. Besides, Morris has denied the
trust, affirming his absolute right to receive
the $2,000. The auditor properly executed
the trust by awarding the money directly
to the church, which, were it awarded to
Morris, would be compelled to resort to a
bill in equity to compel the payment of it to
itself. The Orphans' Court is a court of
equity, and will declare and enforce a trust
in a distribution of the estate.-Hoffner's
Estate, 161 Pa. 331.
The exception to the auditor's report is
dismissed, the report is confirmed. Let
the money be distributed in accordance
therewith.
JOHN ELLIOTI vs. ASA PACIR.
Case,No. 8. -Landlord and tenant-Eviction-S-w ension of rent by eviction.
Assumpsit.
ROBERT P. STUART and GARRETT B.
STEVENS for the plaintiff.

If a tenant retains possession of the
whole premises after an eviction he is liable for rent.-Harberg v. May, 153 Pa. St.
216; Bennett v. Bittle, 4 Rawle 339; Friend
v. Supply Co., 165 Pa. 655.
An eviction of a part of premises, the
tenant using and enjoying the remainder
is liable to the payment of such portion of
rent as value of part retained bears to the
whole. Seabrook v.Moyer, 88 Pa. St. 417;
Allegaert v. Smart, 10 V. N. C. 29; Reed
v. Ward, 22 Pa. St. 144; Linton v. Hart,
25 Pa. St. 163.
If tenant used the premises for two years
after the lease was alleged to have been
broken, he is liable on a quantum meruit.
Bennett v. Bittle, 4 Rawle 344; Seabrook v.
foyer, 88 Pa. St. 417; Lawrence v. French,
25 Wend. 443.
HERTMAN M. SYPHERD and C. R. WEEKS
for the defendant.
Any act on the part of the landlord
which so disturbs the tenant's possession
of the demised premises as to compel him
to abandon the same or deprive him of
their beneficial enjoyment either in whole
or in part, will amount to an eviction.
Koeveler v. Heming, 8 V. N. C. 65;
Magaw v. Lambert, 3 Barr 444; Tiley v.
Meyers, 43 Pa. St. 410.
An eviction from a part of the premises
suspends accruing rent for the whole premises so long as the tenant is not restored to
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thewhole premises. Kesslerv. McConachy,
1 Rawle44l; Bennett v. Bittle, 4 Rawle 340.
Tenant need not abandon the possession of
all the premises, he may retain possession
of the part from which he was not evicted
and cannot be compelled to pay rent.
Sherman v. Williams, 113 Mass. 481; Leishman v. White, 1 Allen 489.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Elliott leased to Packer for a term of five
years a frame house 18 feet wide standing
at one corner of a lot 50 feet wide with a
yard 8 feet deep in the rear of the house.
After Packer had been in the house for
two years, Elliott caused it to be moved
to the opposite corner of the lot, and erected
a brick house on the former site of the
frame house. Packer remained in possession of the house, and during and after the
removal, and had the use of the same
quantity of yard at the new site as at the
old. He however, declined to pay any
rent for the two remaining years. This
assumpsit is to recover this reut of $100,
$50 per year.
Defendant's point is that on all the evidence the plaintiff cannot recover.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Elliott leased to Packer a frame house
with ayard eight feet deep in its rear. The
lease of the house would have been, had
nothing more appeared in it, a lease of the
ground covered by it.-Bennett v. Biitle,
4 R. 340; Sherman v. Williams, 113 Uass.
481. Had the lease been of the first or second story, or of a room or rooms, no interest would be supposed, probably, to pass in
the soil.-Shawmeet National Bank v.
Boston, 118 Mass. 12.5; Leiferman v. Osten,
167 Ill. 93. But inthe Elliottcuse, besides
the house, the yard was distinctly enbraced.
After an occupancy by Packer of the
premises covered by the lease, for the space
of two years, Elliott caused the house to be
moved to the opposite corner of the lot.
It was thus detached from the soil with
which it had formerly been connected. Of
this soil Elliott took exclusive possession.
By this act he evicted Packer from the entire leasehold. The house was separated
from the site it had occupied, and then settled on a new site with which it became
incorporated.
The consequence of an eviction, on the
duty of paying rent is quite clear. Until

the viction ends, the accruing of rent is
arrested. This is true when the tenant is
expelled from only a portion of the leased
land. Though he retains the other portion,
he is under no duty to pay any rent that
would have accrued during the period of
the eviction. Wolf v. Weiner, 7 Phila.
274; Linton v. Hart, 2.5 Pa. 196; Tiley v.
Meyers, 43 Pa. 410; Kessler v. McConachy,
1 R. 441; Smith v. McEnany, 170 Mass. 26;
Royce v. Greggenheim, 106 Mass. 202.
If a partial eviction results in a suspension of the entire rent, a fortiori does a
total eviction. Hoeveler v. Fleming, 8
W. N. C. 65; Magaw v. Lambert, 3 Pa.
444.
'We are aware of the decision to the effect that, when a part of a house is rented,
e. q., the first floor of a two-story frame
building, the removal of the house is not
an eviction of the tenant. Leiferman v.
0shen, 167 Ill. 93. In that case it is remarked by the judge who writes the opinion, "There was nothing in the lease, and
no evidence at the case in bar, to show
that any yard privileges connected with
the first flat, were used in its enjoyment.
None were claimed by appellant, and it
does not appear that he was deprived of
anything that could reasonably be held to
pertain to his lease of the 'first flat' of
No. 12-5 Wolfram street, except that a
different parcel of land was substituted as
the subjacent land necessary to the support of such flat. We are of the opinion
that in view of the law, the jury would
not have been authorized to find that
there was an actual eviction of any part of
the premises leased."
The Elliott lease was not of a part of a
house, but of the house, and also of the
yard. Though Parker continues to.occupy
the house, it does not inclose the same
space on the earth's surface that was leased,
but a wholly different space. It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Parker
has been evicted wholly from the demised
premises It follows then, that no rent
became payable after such eviction.
This result is not changed by the circunistance that the same frame house, was
settled on other land, equal in dimension,
near the former site. Perhaps, for the use
and occupation of this new land, Elliott
would be entitled to compensation, subject
to defalcation of damages arising from the
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breach of Packer's right under the lease. It
is unnecessary to express any opinion upon
this question, for the action is brought
distinctly for the rent under the lease.
Te affirniance of the defendant's point
therefore is inevitable. The plaintiffcannot
recover.
OTTO JOHNSON, EXECUTOR vs.
SARAH FARRELL.
Case No. 9.--ental Capacityof Testators.
Motion for a new trial.
M. WOLF and J. H. REHMi for the plaintiff.
The highest degree of mental capacity is
not required in order to constitute capacity
to make a valid testamentary disposition
of property. -Wilson v. Mitchell, 101 Pa.
495; Cauffman v. Long, 82 Pa. 72; Bitner
v. Bitner, 65 Pa. 347; Cartwright v. Cartwright, 1 Phila. 244. Testimony of events
transpiring four weeks anterior and one
week posterior to event in question does
not conclusively determine such event,
Redfield on Wills, p. 124; Yardl6y v. Cuthbertson, 108 Pa. 408; Thompson v. Kyner, 65 Pa. 368; Boyd v. Eby, 8 Walls 66;
Grabill v. Barr, 5 Pa. 441.
Does not require same capacity to make
a will as to transact business.-Thonpson
v. Kyner, 65 Pa. 268.
HOFFMAN

and SIEGRIST for the defend-

ant.
After a non-professional witness has
stated the facts upon which his opinion is
founded, he is permitted to state his opinion as to sanity or insanity of the testator.
Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Pa. 342; Shaver v.
McCarthy, 110 Pa. 339.
The Court did not err in permitting evidence of the testator's mental condition
four weeks before his death. -Pideock v.
Potter, 68 Pa. 342; Swails v. White, 149 Pa.
261; Bitner v. Bitner, 65 Pa. 347; Wilkinson
v. Pearson, 23 Pa. 120.
A physician who is not an expert may
be asked his opinion upon a hypothetical
case.-People v. Schuyler, 106 N. Y. 290;
State v. Myers, 99 Mo. 107.
OPIN1ON OF COURT.

The feigned issue in tfiis case, has resulted in a verdict by the jury to the effect
that the testator, when he nmade his will,
was insane, and destitute of testamentary
capacity. The proponents of the will in
the motion, are asking for a new trial because of alleged errors in the trial already
had.
1. Four witnesses described business

transactions with the decedent and his behavior, and expressed the opinion that he
was insane. The transactions were irrelevant, except in so far as they tended to reveal insanity. We cannot say thatthey did
not sufficiently tend to reveal insanity, to
justify their coasideration. Conduct during a business transaction may as readily
show an unsound mind, as conduct at
other times. After the behavior of the
person alleged to be insane is described,
if it reasonably points toward insanity, the
opinion of the witness that he was insane
may be given. Pideock v. Potter, 68 Pa.
342; Shaver v. McCarthy, 110 Pa. 339; First
Nat. Bank v. Wireback, 106 Pa. 37. If it
does not thus point, the opinion will be
rejected. 110 Pa. 339. We are not convinced that there was not in the conduct
of Adam Farrell, enough to suggest insanity, and to make an opinion that he
was insane not altogether unreasonable.
The act of two of the witnesses, in completing a contract which was detrimental
to Farrell might weaken their credibility,
by suggesting, either that they did not
believe him insane when they thus dealt
with him or that they were base enough
to deal with him to his disadvantage, despite his insanity. But, how much credit
in view of this conduct of theirs should be
accorded to their testimony it was for the
jury to decide. We cannot even assume
that the verdict is at all founded on their
testimony.
2. A week after the will was made, a
physician examined Farrell, and as he
testifies, found him insane. If this evidence should not have been admitted, the
reason must be that the witness was not
competent to form an opinion ; or that the
discovery of insanity a week after did not
sufficiently tend to disclose insanity at
the execution of the will. The witness
was not a professional alienist, but a mere
physician. The cases are very numerous
in which the opinion of a physician as to
the sanity of hispatient has been admitted.
We are not convinced that this witness
was not sufficiently expert to qualify himself to form an opinion, and to express it
to the jury. Fairchild v. Bascomb, 35 Vt.
398; Davis v. State, 35 Ind. 496; Bitner v.
Bitner, 65 Pa. 347. There are many degrees of expertness. The cases do not demand that a physician shall have confined
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himself to the treatment of mental disorders, or shall have a larger familiarity
with such disorders than a general physician may acquire.
Was the insanity a week after the making of the will irrelevant? As changes of
mental state are not usually sudden, insanity near the time in question is some
evidence of insanity at that time. - Swails
v. White, 149 Pa. 261; Cf Wilkinson v.
Pearson, 23 Pa. 120. It must be remembered that this evidence was additional to
other evidence. Had there been no other,
its relevancy would have depended on the
character and degree of the insanity, and
the physical condition to which it was attributable. These may have been such as
clearly to show that the dementia must
have developed through long stages, and
must therefore have been in existence at
the making of the will.
3. The object of a hypothetical case, is to
secure for the jury an opinion of an expert
who did not observe the patient, and call
judge of his sanity only by means of a
description of his appearance and conduct.
If the description submitted does not at
all tally with the evidence, the opinion
predicated upon it would be irrelevant,
and for that reason inadmissible. But a
strict correspondence between the facts
testified to and the facts assumed in the
case is unnecessary. The inclusion of
some facts not proven, or the exclusion of
some facts revealed in the evidence, would
not necessarily make the opinion of the
expert misleading to the jury. The facts
included or excluded, might not be so influential as to make untrustworthy the
opinion based on the recited facts. It
would be for the court, in the first place,
and ultimately for the jury to say whether
the deviation by the hypothesis from the
established facts was serious enough to
destroy the value of the opinion. The
mere fact that the hypothetical case embraced some facts in support of which no
evidence was offered, would not vitiate it,
or the opinion founded upon it. First
Nat. Bank v. Wireback, 106 Pa. 37.
Whether sqch inclusion would destroy the
value of the opinion would depend on the
materiality of the interjected facts.
4. The other hypothetical case included
no facts of which there was no evidence.
It did not however, embrace all the facts

of which there was evidence. It is impos
sible to foresee how many of the facts testified to, will be found by the jury to have
existed. To exclude a hypothesis, unless
it embraced all, would therefore be idle.
The opinions of experts may be taken on
different groups of facts, and such of them
may be adopted by the jury as are predicated on the group they find to exist. The
jury may find that what witness A says is
true; but not what witness B says. An
opinion based on the assumption of the
truth of what A says would be valuable,
whereas one founded on a confusion of the
testimonies of both A and B might be of
little or no value. So, the jury may find
some of the evidence of a witness to be
true, and some of it, untrue. An opinion
founded on so much of it as the jury finds
to be true, would be more enlightening
than one founded, indiscriminately, on the
whole. We think no error was committed
in permitting the experts to state their
opinions. C'f. Yardley v. Cuthbertson, 108
Pa. 395; Keating's Ap. 2 Mona. 14; Coyle v.
Commonwealth, 104 Pa. 117; Burt v. State,
(Texas) 39 L. R. A. 305.
A new trial is refused.
JOSIAH THORPE vs. HARRY
SIMPSON.
SCHEELINE and SCHUIYLER for plaintiff.
Simpson is guilty of negligence, Pollock on Torts, 83.
Relations by blood alone can control
person of a lunatic. Brewster's Practice
1271.
He who knowingly suffers a creature-on
his premises, likely to do damage, is liable
for damage done by such creature. Earhart vs. Youngblood, 27 Pa. 331.
OILER and MOYER for defendant.
Defendant is not negligent.
On return of inquisition as provided,
finaing the person named therein is a
lunatic, the court may commit his custody
to such person as it may deem most suitable. Act 1836 P. L. 589; Act 1895 P. L.
388.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Simpson had a son, James, who was
liable at intervals to be attacked with
homicidal mania. He had been afflicted
with this disease from the time he reached
his majority, which was nine years before
the cause of the present action. During
his whole lifetime he had resided with his
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father, the defendant, been fed and clothed
by him. During the period of mania he
was usually strictly confined. On Oct. 3,
1896, after a sane interval of six months, he
became again insane, growing daily more
and more violent, until Oct. 9, he rushed
from the house with a carving knife, and
encountering Thorpe on the street, inflicted on him a dangerous wound. He
had not been watched by anybody during
that day, Simpson and his family being
gone from home, leaving him with a servant boy eight years of age, who would
have been unable to control him. In two
previous paroxysms, the earlier of which
occurred in Feb. 1895 and the later in Dec.
1895, James Simpson had seized a similar
knife and chased a servant with it, but
had inflicted no harm.
Motion for compulsory non-suit.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This case, we think must be decided by
well known principles. If X maintains
on his premises, and under his control,
anything, animate or inanimate, which
has a propensity to inflict hurt, he must
at least exercise high care, to prevent the
hurt. He cannot accumulate water in a
reservoir, he cannot store gun powder, he
cannot build a fire, he cannot keep a vicious
dog, bull, bear, tiger, without falling under
a duty of great care, so to restrain or guard
them, or to prevent their injuring others.
As to animals, Cf. Cooley, Torts, 502; Dolph
v. Ferris, 7 W. & S. 367; Mann v. Weiand,
81J Pa. 243; Earhart v. Youngblood, 27 Pa.
331. As to fire, Cf. Webbs' Pollock, Torts,
616. As to water, Cf. Fletcher v. Rylands,
L. R. 1 Ex. 278; Webbs' Pollock, Torts,
599.
Nor, is the duty with respect to animals, etc., dependent on ownership. If
one harbors them, he makes himself liable
for injuries inflicted by them.
Cooley,
Torts, 406. The fact that the tie between
Harry Simpson and his son, was not that
of property, does not preclude the former's

becoming liable for the acts of the latter.
In Hoverson v. Noker, 60 Wis. 511, cited
17 Am. and Eng. Ency. 393, a father was
held responsible for injuries arising from
his minor son's frightening a horse by the
firing of a pistol, the son's propensity to
do such acts having been known to the
father. In Dean v. St. Paul Union Depot
Co. (Minn.), 5 L. R. A. 442, the defendant
was responsible for an assault committed by one whom it permitted, with
knowledge of his violent character, to
remain in the depot. In Henderson v.
Dade Coal Co. (Ga), 40 L. R. A. the company was the lessee of convicts. For a.
rape committed by one of them, it was
apparently conceded that the company
might be liable, if it appeared that it had
reasonable ground for apprehending that
the crime would be committed.
James Simpson, when in the state of
mania, was not eriminally responsible for
his acts. His dangerousness was known
to his father, for he was usually strictly
confined.
The attack of mania began
October 3d, and grew daily more violent
until October 9th. On that day he was
left in the house by his father without restraint. In previous attacks of his malady,
he had twice chased a servant with a
carving knife. The evidence is sufficient
to justify the inference, that he had a disposition to use this species of weapon
against persons, and that this fact was
known to his*father. The evidence further, would justify the inference that due
care was not employed by the father, in
confining him.
The father had no right to kill the
maniacal son. He might have caused his
removal to a suitable asylum. Neglecting
to do this, we think he was under an obligation to adopt rqasonable precautions
against the infliction of injury upon persons lawfully walking in the street.
The motion for a compulsory non-suit is
therefore overruled.

